Objections to Christian Belief By D.M MacKinnon, A.R. Vidler, H.A. Williams, and J.S. Bezzant ----------------------- Contents: Scan / Edit Notes Introduction A.R. Vidler 1. - Moral Objections - by D.M. MacKinnon 2. - Psychological Objections - by H.A. Williams 3. - Historical Objections - by A.R. Vidler 4. - Intellectual Objections - by J.S. Bezzant ----------------------- Scan / Edit Notes An interesting book discussing the objections that are raised to Christianity. Some of the points made are relevant not only to Christianity but also in regards to other religions (though I doubt that was their intention). Four different authors present their understanding of why they object, and they do so from four different perspectives. Whether one believes in X faith or not this book still makes for a quick (but interesting) read. (C) 1963 Genera: Religion-Theology Text Version - v 1.0 Html Version - v 1.5 -Salmun. ----------------------- Introduction This course of lectures was given in Cambridge in February 1963 under the auspices of the Divinity Faculty. But they were open lectures, i.e. addressed to the University as a whole, not to theological students. It is much to be desired that representatives of the different Faculties should take opportunities of speaking to as large a public as possible, so overcoming the academic tendency to a narrow specialization or departmentalism. The aim of the lectures, which are here published practically as they were delivered, was not to provide answers to objections to Christian belief. There is a spate of books which set out to do that. We hold that it is more important to try to plumb the depths of the objections, without complacently assuming that answers are readily available. Above all in a university, Christians must seek to understand the fundamental doubts to which their faith is exposed in this age of the world. These lectures were intended to contribute to that kind of understanding. They were thus intended to be disturbing rather than reassuring. Belief in Christianity, or in anything else, if it is to be mature, must want to face the worst that can be said against it and to evade no difficulties. As W.H. Hallock said, 'no one is fit to encounter an adversary's case successfully unless he can make it for the moment his own, unless he can put it more forcibly than the adversary could put it for himself, and take account not only of what the adversary says, but also of the best he might say, if only he had chanced to think of it.' It may be thought that objections to Christian belief would be more convincingly stated by unbelievers than by believers. Certainly Christians should listen attentively to all who submit their beliefs to an acute and sensitive criticism. But the objections are likely to be perceived and felt even more keenly by people who, maybe for many years, have been living with one foot in Christian belief and the other resolutely planted in the radical unbelief of the contemporary world, so that they are, as it were, torn between the two. If there is to be a profound recovery of Christian belief - or a profound rejection of it - it will surely come out of such an experience rather than out of an awareness of only one side of the question. It has been said that 'the problem of evil is pregnant with mysteries. Perhaps it is more important and shows more insight to be aware of these mysteries, and even of the impossibility of solving them, than to find consolation in an easy and hence illusory logical issue out of this most issueless and tragic of all problems' (E. Lampert). There is not very much that is new in the problem of evil, but as a result of advances in the sciences, of a larger moral sensibility and of changes in the philosophical climate there are today genuinely new or greatly intensified challenges to Christian belief. It is some of them that these lectures were concerned to explore. A.R. Vidler King's College Cambridge ----------------------- Moral Objections By D.M. Mackinnon Christianity is regularly presented as a way of life and as such it is presented as demanding from those who profess it a certain pattern of moral behaviour. From this pattern Christians may depart; but with very important differences between divergent traditions of Christian faith and practice (e.g. over artificial contraception), there is a certain measure of agreement concerning what constitutes Christian moral behaviour. Now it is one of the features of the world in which we live that this venerable tradition is under fire from a great many directions, and subject to critical pressures at a number of different levels. It is with the characterization of some of these criticisms that I am concerned tonight. Thus there has been a great deal of discussion recently in the press and elsewhere arising out of Professor Carstairs' series of Reith Lectures. I am not concerned with the accuracy with which Professor Carstairs' own mind has been reported; what I want simply to advertise is that in these discussions the Christian tradition has been attacked on the ground that it stresses the importance of pre-marital abstinence from sexual relations and fails either to reckon with psychological tensions such abstinence may set up in individuals, or to present any sort of adequate positive image of human life. I want to concentrate on the latter more general criticism; it is a good example of the extent to which Christian morality is regarded as a morality of obligation, even of command. Christians may protest against this interpretation of what they say. They may argue roughly as follows: 'While some Christian denominations may identify the sanction or authority of this morality with the will of God, in fact the great tradition of Christian thought has found that authority to reside not in an arbitrary divine fiat or command but in the ways in which what we are morally bound to do provides the road to our own actualization as human beings; we rise to the full stature of our humanity, we become truly human by obedience to the dictates of the moral law. This is the broad high road to true health, individual and collective alike.' If we apply this interpretation to help our understanding of the issues raised in Carstairs' broadcasts, we find that those issues are partly transformed. The claim is now one that those who condone pre-marital sexual intercourse are, wrong in fact. Such behaviour is perilously likely to prove destructive of the integrity, even of the stability and peace of mind, of those who practise it. They are failing to reckon with their total nature as human beings: they are isolating sexual activity from human life as a whole; although they claim to acknowledge its importance, they are failing to reckon with the extent to which its pressures invade and shape human life as a whole. What are conventionally called illicit relationships provide the sort of soil in which self-deceit and masquerade can flourish, and men and women are consequently easily estranged from the substance of their being. Whatever we may think of this sort of argument (and I shall have more to say on this issue later) we must allow that this sort of emphasis considerably mitigates, if not altogether alters, the presentation of Christian morality as an ethic of sheer obligation. We are no longer forced to see ourselves as restrained by the arbitrary dictates of a God; we are rather encouraged to see ourselves as enticed by the way of obligation to tread the road of our proper humanity. But two very serious questions arise here. (a) How adequate is the image of the good life which is offered? It can hardly be denied that a widespread obsessional preoccupation with the alleged great evil of the remarriage of divorced persons creates the impression that the core and centre of Christian moral teaching is a particular interpretation of the indissolubility of marriage; on this view it is taken as putting an appalling stigma on these second unions, of which we have all met examples, and know to have been more abundantly justified by their fruits than the frequently tragic human distress they have replaced. It is impossible to escape the impression that, to certain sorts of clergy, the effective exclusion from sacramental communion of divorced persons who have remarried is the highest form of the Churches moral witness. The cynic might well be tempted to say that the heartless zeal frequently displayed in the bearing of this particular testimony is a way in which ecclesiastics compensate for their unwillingness to engage with other besetting moral issues of our age, for instance the moral permissibility of nuclear weapons. I mention this issue, speaking in deliberately harsh terms (although no harsher perhaps than the callousness of our moral bigots merits) because it seems to pin-point the question immediately raised by the moral tradition which I have expounded. How adequate to human life as men and women live it is this image of the good life? Does it do justice to the heights and depths, to the pity and terror, of life as we know it? It is this question which is in fact one of those raised by the many who speak of Christianity as life-denying rather than life-affirming or life-enhancing; and it is with that criticism before all others that this lecture is concerned. But let there be no mistake at this point. If we seek to rebut the criticisms brought against our Christian image of the good life by saying that thus and thus runs the writ of the divine law, we are simply assuming the language of an ethic of obligation. You cannot have it both ways: either this way of living is commended because it is self-justifying or it is commanded because i...
WMatrixie