Osprey - Campaign 395 - The Winter Campaign in Italy 1943.pdf

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THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
IN ITALY 1943
Orsogna, San Pietro and Ortona
PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI
ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE
CAMPAIGN 395
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
IN ITALY 1943
Orsogna, San Pietro and Ortona
PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI
ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE
Series editor Nikolai Bogdanovic
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
Allied
n
Axis
5
7
8
OPPOSING FORCES
Allied
n
Axis
n
Orders of battle
13
OPPOSING PLANS
Allied
n
Axis
21
THE CAMPAIGN
Approaching the Winter Line
n
US Fifth Army approaches the Winter Line
n
The first battle of San
Pietro
n
The second battle of San Pietro
n
BR Eighth Army’s crossing of the Sangro
n
NZ 2nd Division’s
first attempts against Orsona
n
The battle of Orsona: Operation
Torso
n
Outflanking Orsona:
Operation
Florence
n
Stalemate
n
The advance from the Moro River
n
Ortona: the first phase
n
Fighting
into Ortona
29
AFTERMATH
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY
FURTHER READING
INDEX
91
93
94
95
The Italian front, September 1943–January 1944
Viktor (Volturno) Line
Barbara (Biferno) Line
Bernhardt (Winter) Line
Gustav Line, final outline in January 1944
XXX
Pescara
LXXVI
ra
ca
N
Ortona
Lanciano
Chieti
Adriatic Sea
s
Pe
Guardiagrele
Orsogna
Sa
n
gro
Landing
2 Oct
Vasto
V
Br
From 11 Oct
XXX
Sulmona
Termoli
Trig
no
Bif
ern
o
Fo
XXX
o
gli
an
Gaeta
Ga
ri
i
Lir
re
rto
XIV
Ra
Isernia
o
pid
Campobasso
II
US
Since 18 Nov
XXX
Cassino
San Pietro
Mignano
27 Sep
Foggia
Vo
ltu
rno
Calore
XIII
Br
XXX
Benevento
Caserta
tu
Vol
rno
Ofanto
Naples
Salerno
X
Br
XXX
XXX
Potenza
Tan
a
gro
Allied advance
Front line, 15 September 1943
Front line, 3 October 1943
Front line, 1 December 1943
Front line, 19 January 1944
VI
US
0
20 miles
20km
Tyrrhenian Sea
0
4
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
In late October 1943, the Allied Chiefs of Staff still believed that their forces
‘could be in Rome before Christmas’. Such an illusory opinion is revealing
of the attitude with which both sides approached the Italian campaign. From
the Allied side, before US Fifth Army’s landing at Salerno and the British
seizure of Taranto, coupled with BR Eighth Army’s advance in Calabria, no
one had a clear idea of what to do next. The only certainty was Rome, the
ideal goal of the entire campaign.
By 17 September, as the Germans withdrew from Salerno and BR Eighth
Army made its way up Italy’s boot, the Allied commanders were convinced
that German forces would withdraw to northern Italy. Thus, tying down
German units and preventing their possible use in North-West Europe
became the immediate aim of Allied strategy. That Hitler considered this
option as well is revealing of the complete uncertainty surrounding the early
stages of the campaign.
Concerned by an Allied move against the Balkans, Hitler took into
account the defence of southern Italy only insofar as it could help by reacting
to a landing in Greece or Yugoslavia. The only other reason for maintaining
control of most of the country was exploitation. As such, the Italian campaign
assumed its final form in an almost accidental manner. While Hitler ordered
a slow withdrawal from southern Italy in order to gain time, generals Dwight
D. Eisenhower and Harold Alexander planned a two-pronged drive on Rome
by means of an amphibious landing just south of the city.
In October 1943, the plan seemed feasible. The Allied armies began
advancing up the Italian peninsula, slowly but successfully. The first German
lines of defence were crushed, thanks to successful operations like the Termoli
landing, and by the end of the month the US Fifth and BR Eighth armies had
established a continuous front north of Naples and north of Foggia. It was at
this point that Hitler made his mind up, and ordered his units to defend for
as long as possible. The decision, suggested by Generalfeldmarschall Albert
Kesselring, offered many advantages, such as the possibility of defending
the narrowest part of Italy – the Gaeta–Ortona line – with just a dozen
divisions. In order to accomplish this aim, the Bernhardt Line was built,
followed by a second defensive line centred around the town of Cassino,
which was named Gustav.
In November 1943, the Allied armies had not yet attempted to overcome
any of the German defensive lines. US Fifth Army halted at the Mignano
Gap, across which ran Highway 6 to Rome, while BR Eighth Army was
preparing to cross the Sangro River. The plan was for the latter to advance
5

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