Osprey - Campaign 396 - Japans Indian Ocean Raid 1942.pdf

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CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
CHRONOLOGY
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
Japanese
n
British
5
7
8
OPPOSING FORCES
Japanese
n
British
n
Orders of Battle
12
OPPOSING PLANS
Japanese
n
British
30
THE CAMPAIGN
Opening Japanese Moves
n
The Invasion of the Andaman Islands
n
The Striking Force Enters the
Indian Ocean
n
Somerville’s Manoeuvring
n
The Striking Force is Detected
n
The Attack on Colombo
The Death of
Cornwall
and
Dorsetshire
n
Shadow Boxing Between 5 and 9 April
n
The Attack on
Trincomalee
n
Operations of the Malaya Unit Striking Force
n
Japanese Submarine Operations
n
Operation
C
– the Final Accounting
n
36
AFTERMATH
FURTHER READING
INDEX
87
94
95
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Even before the Japanese had completed their conquest of British Malaya and
Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, plans were being made for the invasion
of Burma. Expansion into Burma was viewed as vital to provide a strategic
buffer for the just-conquered southern resource areas and as a means to cut
off supply routes into China. The problem for the Japanese was that adequate
forces were not immediately available for an invasion of Burma.
The faster than expected pace of operations since the start of the war made
the Japanese hasten plans to invade Burma. The result was an agreement
between the Imperial Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN) on 22 January 1942 to
mount operations to seize key points in Burma. After seizing the airfields in
southern Burma and the key port of Rangoon, the IJN agreed to move two
divisions by sea to Rangoon to allow the IJA to prosecute operations into the
rest of Burma. Following that, the IJN was tasked with protecting the Army’s
sea lines of communications (SLOC) into Burma.
Though it was not part of Japanese pre-war planning, it quickly became
apparent to the Japanese that the Andaman Islands in the eastern Indian
Ocean were critical to the defence of the southern resource areas and the
SLOCs supporting Japanese troops in Burma. Accordingly, on 4 February
the Navy General Staff informed the Combined Fleet that it planned to seize
the islands. Three days later, orders were issued to that effect.
Another emergent addition to Japanese plans in the initial stage of the
war was the seizure of Christmas Island, a volcanic island located 220nm
south of Java in the Indian Ocean. Its location placed it astride the SLOC
between India and Australia. It also could provide depth for the defence of
the southern resource area. On 14 March, the Navy General Staff issued
orders to the Combined Fleet to capture the island.
There were other IJN planners that advocated far larger operations in
the Indian Ocean. Strategic planning in the IJN was complicated by the fact
that it was not done by a single entity. Formal responsibility for strategic
planning rested with the First Section of the Navy General Staff. In reality,
the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, had a
more significant role. Members of the Navy General Staff advocated for a
significant expansion of operations in the Indian Ocean, including taking
Ceylon. Such an undertaking promised massive potential benefits. British
SLOCs in the Indian Ocean would be cut and the British position in the
Persian Gulf threatened.
A major advance to the west was not part of Japan’s pre-war expansion
plans. The IJA failed to support it. Most importantly, Yamamoto had
.
5

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